G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11002
DP11002 Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory
Patrick W. Schmitz; Eva Hoppe-Fischer
发表日期2015-12-20
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We present the first large-scale laboratory experiment designed to capture the canonical hidden action problem as studied in contract theory, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In line with contract theory, when effort is a hidden action, the chosen effort levels crucially depend on the contractibility of the outcome. In our one-shot experiment the players endogenously negotiate contracts. In the absence of communication, they typically avoid gift-exchange situations. Even when the outcome is contractible and the hidden action problem is typically overcome with incentive-compatible contracts, communication is helpful since it may reduce strategic uncertainty.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Contract theory Hidden action Incentive theory Laboratory experiments Moral hazard
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11002
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539831
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Patrick W. Schmitz,Eva Hoppe-Fischer. DP11002 Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory. 2015.
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