| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11002 |
| DP11002 Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Eva Hoppe-Fischer | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present the first large-scale laboratory experiment designed to capture the canonical hidden action problem as studied in contract theory, comparing treatments with unobservable effort to benchmark treatments with verifiable effort. In line with contract theory, when effort is a hidden action, the chosen effort levels crucially depend on the contractibility of the outcome. In our one-shot experiment the players endogenously negotiate contracts. In the absence of communication, they typically avoid gift-exchange situations. Even when the outcome is contractible and the hidden action problem is typically overcome with incentive-compatible contracts, communication is helpful since it may reduce strategic uncertainty. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contract theory Hidden action Incentive theory Laboratory experiments Moral hazard |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11002 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539831 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Eva Hoppe-Fischer. DP11002 Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Contract Theory. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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