G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11008
DP11008 Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents
Xavier Gabaix; Emmanuel Farhi
发表日期2015-12-20
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要This paper develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents. We use a general behavioral framework that encompasses a wide range of behavioral biases such as misperceptions, internalities and mental accounting. We revisit the three pillars of optimal taxation: Ramsey (linear commodity taxation to raise revenues and redistribute), Pigou (linear commodity taxation to correct externalities) and Mirrlees (nonlinear income taxation). We show how the canonical optimal tax formulas are modified and lead to a rich set of novel economic insights. We also show how to incorporate nudges in the optimal taxation frameworks, and jointly characterize optimal taxes and nudges. We explore the Diamond-Mirrlees productive efficiency result and the Atkinson-Stiglitz uniform commodity taxation proposition, and find that they are more likely to fail with behavioral agents.
主题Public Economics
关键词Behavioural public finance Inattention Mistakes Nudges
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11008
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539837
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Xavier Gabaix,Emmanuel Farhi. DP11008 Optimal Taxation with Behavioral Agents. 2015.
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