| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11020 |
| DP11020 An Experiment on Social Mislearning | |
| Matthew Rabin; Erik Eyster | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-12-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by their observed predecessors' actions. Each participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants' signals plus her own. In a first treatment, participants move single-file and observe all predecessors' entries; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) predicts that each participant simply add her signal to her immediate predecessor's entry. Although 75% of participants do so, redundancy neglect by the other 25% generates excess imitation and mild inefficiencies. In a second treatment, participants move four per period; BNE predicts that most players anti-imitate some observed entries. Such anti-imitation occurs in 35% of the most transparent cases, and 16% overall. The remaining redundancy neglect creates dramatic excess imitation and inefficiencies: late-period entries are far too extreme, and on average participants would earn substantially more by ignoring their predecessors altogether. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Experiments Higher-order beliefs Redundancy neglect Social learning |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11020 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539849 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Rabin,Erik Eyster. DP11020 An Experiment on Social Mislearning. 2015. |
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