| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11039 |
| DP11039 The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions | |
| Gerard Van den Berg; Arne Uhlendorff | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante threat of sanctions. We analyze the effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on the unemployment duration and the quality of job matches, in conjunction with the possibility to report sick. We estimate multi-spell duration models with selection on unobserved characteristics. We find that vacancy referrals increase the transition to work and that these jobs go along with a lower wage. However, we also find a positive effect of receiving a vacancy referral on the probability of reporting sick. This effect is smaller at high durations, which suggests that the value of a vacancy referral increases over the time spent in unemployment. Overall, around 9% of sickness absence during unemployment is induced by vacancy referrals. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Monitoring Moral hazard Physician Unemployment Unemployment insurance Vacancy referrals Wage |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11039 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539868 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gerard Van den Berg,Arne Uhlendorff. DP11039 The Role of Sickness in the Evaluation of Job Search Assistance and Sanctions. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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