| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11087 |
| DP11087 Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory | |
| Laurent Bouton; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Frederic Malherbe | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Constructive abstention Framing Information aggregation Laboratory experiments Unanimity rule Veto power |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11087 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539916 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Laurent Bouton,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Frederic Malherbe. DP11087 Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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