| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11113 |
| DP11113 Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards | |
| Aner Sela | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study two-stage all-pay contests where there is synergy between the stages. The reward for each contestant is fixed in the first stage while it is effort-dependent in the second one. We assume that a player's effort in the first stage either increases (positive synergy) or decreases (negative synergy) his reward in the second stage. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this contest is analyzed with either positive or negative synergy. We show, in particular, that whether the contestants are symmetric or asymmetric their expected payoffs may be higher under negative synergy than under positive synergy. Consequently, they prefer smaller rewards (negative synergy) over higher ones (positive synergy). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Effort-dependent rewards Two-stage all-pay contests |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11113 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539933 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela. DP11113 Two-stage contests with effort-dependent rewards. 2016. |
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