| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11126 |
| DP11126 One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime | |
| [unavailable] | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-20 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Favoritism Patronage Authoritarian regime Political connection Hometown Infrastructure Distributive politics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11126 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539943 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | [unavailable]. DP11126 One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [[unavailable]]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [[unavailable]]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [[unavailable]]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
