| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11127 |
| DP11127 Linear voting Rules | |
| Hans Peter Grüner; Thomas Tröger | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-21 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly and monetary transfers are not feasible? Considering symmetric voters with private valuations, we show that it is utilitarian-optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternative-dependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Standard quorum rules are not optimal. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for linear rules that are optimal under compulsory participation. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Mechanisms design Optimal voting rules Costly voting Compulsory voting Quorum rules |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11127 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539944 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Peter Grüner,Thomas Tröger. DP11127 Linear voting Rules. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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