| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11140 |
| DP11140 Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Effectiveness | |
| Roel Beetsma; Xavier Debrun | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-02-26 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper discusses the effectiveness of independent fiscal institutions—or fiscal councils—in taming the deficit bias that emerged in the 1970s. After a review of the main theoretical arguments and recent trends about fiscal councils, we develop a stylized model showing how a fiscal council can effectively mitigate the deficit bias even though it has no direct lever on the conduct of fiscal policy. We show that the capacity of the fiscal council to improve the public’s understanding of the quality of fiscal policy contributes to better align voters and policymakers’ incentives and to tame the deficit bias affecting well-intended governments. After mapping the model’s key features into a broad set of criteria likely to contribute to the effectiveness of a fiscal council, we use the 2014 vintage of the IMF dataset on independent fiscal institutions to assess whether existing institutions have been built to work. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Fiscal policy Deficit bias Independent fiscal institutions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11140 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539956 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roel Beetsma,Xavier Debrun. DP11140 Fiscal Councils: Rationale and Effectiveness. 2016. |
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