| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11153 |
| DP11153 The invisible hand of the government: "Moral suasion" during the European sovereign debt crisis | |
| Neeltje van Horen; Steven Ongena; Alexander Popov | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-03 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using proprietary data on banks’ monthly securities holdings, we find that during the European sovereign debt crisis, domestic banks in fiscally stressed countries were considerably more likely than foreign banks to increase their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds in months with relatively high domestic sovereign bond issuance. This effect is stronger for state‐owned banks and for banks with low initial holdings of domestic sovereign bonds, and it is not fuelled by Central Bank liquidity provision. Our results point to a “moral suasion” mechanism, and they are not driven by concurrent risk‐shifting, carry‐trading, regulatory compliance, or shocks to investment opportunities. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Sovereign debt Sovereign‐bank loop Moral suasion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11153 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539966 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Neeltje van Horen,Steven Ongena,Alexander Popov. DP11153 The invisible hand of the government: "Moral suasion" during the European sovereign debt crisis. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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