| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11154 |
| DP11154 Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation | |
| Mariassunta Giannetti; Jose Maria Liberti; Jason Sturgess | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-03 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We show that banks manipulate the credit ratings of their borrowers before being compelled to share them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of information disclosure of the Argentinean public credit registry, we disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. We show that banks downgrade high quality borrowers on which they have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks also upgrade low quality borrowers to avoid creditor runs. Our results can explain the limited effectiveness of public credit registries and cast doubt on the use of credit ratings in reducing information asymmetry |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11154 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539967 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mariassunta Giannetti,Jose Maria Liberti,Jason Sturgess. DP11154 Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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