| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11171 |
| DP11171 Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks: Bail in under Single Point of Entry versus Multiple Points of Entry | |
| Beatrice Weder di Mauro; Ester Faia | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-16 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The design of resolution regimes for global groups has been the central theme since the global financial crisis. No model rationalized the optimal design of bail-in regimes and their welfare consequences. We do so in a model with strategically optimizing authorities and banks. We model three regimes: cooperative-SPE (Single Point of Entry), uncooperative-SPE and MPE (Multiple Points of Entry). Welfare losses in each regime depend on the degree of banks’ liabilities home bias. SPE cooperative generally minimizes losses since authorities internalize cross-country spillovers, unless groups are highly decentralized. High capital requirements by acting as discipline devise reduce losses and blur the difference between regimes. SPE has however unintended consequences: under cooperation it increases financial re-trenchment in previously segmented markets (by the same token it stimulates integration in well integrated markets), under non-cooperation subsidiarization emerges as an endogenous outcome. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics and Finance |
| 关键词 | Global financial architecture Recovery and resolution planing Single point of entry Strategic regulatory interaction Financial spillover Financial retrenchment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11171 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539988 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Beatrice Weder di Mauro,Ester Faia. DP11171 Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks: Bail in under Single Point of Entry versus Multiple Points of Entry. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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