G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11176
DP11176 Does gender-balancing the board reduce firm value?
Karin S. Thorburn; B Espen Eckbo
发表日期2016-03-18
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要A board gender quota reduces firm value if it forces the appointment of under-qualified female directors. We examine this costly constraint hypothesis using the natural experiment created by Norway's 2005 board gender-quota law. This law drove the average fraction of female directors from 5% in 2001 to 40% by 2008, producing a large exogenous shock to director experience and independence. However, statistically robust analyses of quota-induced shareholder announcement returns, and of long-run stock and accounting performance, fail to reject the hypothesis of a zero valuation effect of this shock to board composition. Moreover, firms did not expand board size, nor is there significant evidence of quota-induced corporate conversions to a (non-public) legal form exempted from the quota law. Finally, our evidence on female director turnover and a novel network-based measure of director gender-power gap also fails to suggest that qualified female directors were in short supply.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Gender quota Director independence Valuation effect Corporate conversion Busy directors Director network power Long-run performance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11176
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539993
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Karin S. Thorburn,B Espen Eckbo. DP11176 Does gender-balancing the board reduce firm value?. 2016.
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