G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11179
DP11179 Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation
Fabian Herweg
发表日期2016-03-20
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award procedure when the procurer cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for more complex designs, it is optimal to fix a simple design ex ante and to renegotiate to a more complex and costlier design ex post. Specifying a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Auction Cost overrun Procurement Renegotiation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11179
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539995
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Fabian Herweg. DP11179 Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation. 2016.
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