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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11179 |
DP11179 Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation | |
Fabian Herweg | |
发表日期 | 2016-03-20 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award procedure when the procurer cannot commit not to renegotiate. If cost differences are more pronounced for more complex designs, it is optimal to fix a simple design ex ante and to renegotiate to a more complex and costlier design ex post. Specifying a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Auction Cost overrun Procurement Renegotiation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11179 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/539995 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabian Herweg. DP11179 Optimal Cost Overruns: Procurement Auctions and Renegotiation. 2016. |
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