| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11192 |
| DP11192 Employment protection and unemployment benefits: On technology adoption and job creation in a matching model | |
| Kjell Erik Lommerud; Steinar Vagstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-24 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyse the effects of different labour market policies employment protection, un- employment bene ts and payroll taxes on job creation and technology choices in a model where fi rms are randomly matched with workers of different productivity and wages are de- termined by ex-post bargaining. The model is characterised by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with work- ersbargaining strength. Results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if the hold-up problem is relatively important and workers value income security much. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Unemployment in- Technology adoption Job creation Employment protection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11192 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540009 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kjell Erik Lommerud,Steinar Vagstad. DP11192 Employment protection and unemployment benefits: On technology adoption and job creation in a matching model. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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