| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11205 |
| DP11205 Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters | |
| Bruno Jullien; Hanna Halaburda | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-03-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the market in the previous period becomes ``focal'' in the current period, in that agents play the equilibrium in which they adopt the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for ``patient'' platforms; with an infinite time horizon, however, there are multiple equilibria where either the low- or high-quality platform dominates. If qualities are stochastic, the platform with a better average quality wins with a higher probability, even when its realized quality is lower, and this probability increases as platforms become more patient. Hence social welfare may decline as platforms become more forward looking. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Network externalities Dynamic competition Coordination |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11205 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540022 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruno Jullien,Hanna Halaburda. DP11205 Dynamic Competition with Network Externalities: Why History Matters. 2016. |
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