G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11207
DP11207 The value of incumbency in heterogeneous platforms
JACQUES CREMER; Gary Biglaiser
发表日期2016-03-31
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We study the dynamics of competition in a model with network effects, an incumbent and entry. We propose a new way of representing the strategic advantages of incumbency in a static model. We then embed this static analysis in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. We completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with two platforms will emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the profits of the incumbent when there is only one platform at equilibrium.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Network externalities Network effects Plaforms
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11207
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540024
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
JACQUES CREMER,Gary Biglaiser. DP11207 The value of incumbency in heterogeneous platforms. 2016.
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