| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11215 |
| DP11215 The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-05 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We report data from a laboratory experiment with 566 participants that was designed to test Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) management of innovation theory. A research unit and a customer can invest to increase the probability of making an innovation. When the innovation is made, the parties bargain over the division of the revenue. In line with Aghion and Tirole's (1994a) predictions based on the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach, we find that ownership matters for the division of the revenue and the investments. However, communication can somewhat mitigate the theoretical problem that the customer will not relinquish ownership to the cash-constrained research unit. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Property rights Incomplete contracts Investment incentives Laboratory experiments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11215 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540033 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP11215 The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Patrick W. Schmitz]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Patrick W. Schmitz]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Patrick W. Schmitz]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
