| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11217 |
| DP11217 Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Susanne Goldlücke | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-07 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A pollution-generating firm (the principal) can offer a contract to an agent (say, a nearby town) who has the right to be free of pollution. Subsequently, the agent privately learns the disutility caused by pollution. Then a production level and a payment from the principal to the agent are implemented as contractually specified. We explore the implications of a non-negativity constraint on the payment. For low cost types there is underproduction, while for high cost types there is overproduction. Hence, there may be too much pollution compared to the first-best solution (which is in contrast to standard adverse selection models). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hidden information Externalities Coasean bargaining Incentive contracting Limited liability |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11217 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540035 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Susanne Goldlücke. DP11217 Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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