G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11217
DP11217 Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments
Patrick W. Schmitz; Susanne Goldlücke
发表日期2016-04-07
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要A pollution-generating firm (the principal) can offer a contract to an agent (say, a nearby town) who has the right to be free of pollution. Subsequently, the agent privately learns the disutility caused by pollution. Then a production level and a payment from the principal to the agent are implemented as contractually specified. We explore the implications of a non-negativity constraint on the payment. For low cost types there is underproduction, while for high cost types there is overproduction. Hence, there may be too much pollution compared to the first-best solution (which is in contrast to standard adverse selection models).
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Hidden information Externalities Coasean bargaining Incentive contracting Limited liability
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11217
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540035
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Patrick W. Schmitz,Susanne Goldlücke. DP11217 Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments. 2016.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Patrick W. Schmitz]的文章
[Susanne Goldlücke]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Patrick W. Schmitz]的文章
[Susanne Goldlücke]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Patrick W. Schmitz]的文章
[Susanne Goldlücke]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。