| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11220 |
| DP11220 You Are Judged by the Company You Keep: Reputation Leverage in Vertically Related Markets | |
| Martin Peitz; Jay Pil Choi | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes a mechanism through which a supplier of unknown quality can overcome its asymmetric information problem by selling via a reputable downstream firm. The supplier's adverse-selection problem can be solved if the downstream fi rm has established a reputation for delivering high quality vis-à-vis the supplier. The supplier may enter the market by initially renting the downstream fi rms reputation. The downstream fi rm may optimally source its input externally, even though sourcing internally would be better in terms of productive efficiency. Since an entrant in the downstream market may lack reputation, it may suffer from a reputational barrier to entry arising from higher input costs. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Incumbency advantage Experience goods Outsourcing Branding Barriers to entry Certification intermediaries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11220 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540038 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Peitz,Jay Pil Choi. DP11220 You Are Judged by the Company You Keep: Reputation Leverage in Vertically Related Markets. 2016. |
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