| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11222 |
| DP11222 A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard | |
| Roland Strausz | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-09 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Crowdfunding provides the innovation that it enables entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before the investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard threatens this benefit. Studying the subsequent trade-off between screening and moral hazard, the paper characterizes optimal mechanisms. Popular all-or-nothing reward-crowdfunding schemes reflect their salient features. Efficiency is sustainable only if returns exceed investment costs by a margin reflecting the degree of moral hazard. Constrained efficient mechanisms exhibit underinvestment. As a screening tool for valuable projects, crowdfunding promotes social welfare. Crowdfunding complements rather than substitutes traditional entrepreneurial financing. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Crowdfunding entrepreneurship Moral hazard Aggregate demand uncertainty Venture capital |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11222 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Strausz. DP11222 A Theory of Crowdfunding - a mechanism design approach with demand uncertainty and moral hazard. 2016. |
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