Gateway to Think Tanks
来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11223 |
DP11223 Incentive Compatible Advertising on a Social Network | |
Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler | |
发表日期 | 2016-04-11 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | A platform that operates a social network allows firms to post display ads to network members. Each member is interested in exactly one type of product. The network structure is correlated with the profile of members' privately known preferences over product types. The platform's policy consists of a display rule (which specifies the stationary probability with which each product is shown to each network member, as a function of the network structure) and an advertising fee (which the platform charges from firms as a function of their reported type). We provide conditions for the existence of an incentive-compatible policy that maximizes and fully extracts firms' surplus. This objective is easier to attain when the network is more informative of members' preferences, consumers are more attentive to advertising and their frequency of repeated purchases is higher, and advertisers are less informed of the network structure. We provide a more detailed characterization when the network is generated according to the "stochastic block model", thus linking our model to the "community detection" problem in Network Science. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11223 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540041 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kfir Eliaz,Ran Spiegler. DP11223 Incentive Compatible Advertising on a Social Network. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Kfir Eliaz]的文章 |
[Ran Spiegler]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Kfir Eliaz]的文章 |
[Ran Spiegler]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Kfir Eliaz]的文章 |
[Ran Spiegler]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。