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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11243 |
DP11243 Agency Conflicts Around the World | |
Norman Schürhoff; Erwan Morellec | |
发表日期 | 2016-04-25 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to quantify agency conflicts across legal and institutional environments and decompose their effects into wealth transfers among stakeholders and value losses from policy distortions. Our estimates show that agency costs are large and vary widely across and within countries. Legal origin and provisions for investor protection affect agency costs, but they are more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally into wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions, the latter being larger where ownership is dispersed. Incentive misalignment captures 60% of country variation in leverage. |
主题 | Financial Economics |
关键词 | Capital structure Agency conflicts Corporate governance Structural estimation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11243 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540061 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Norman Schürhoff,Erwan Morellec. DP11243 Agency Conflicts Around the World. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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