G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11243
DP11243 Agency Conflicts Around the World
Norman Schürhoff; Erwan Morellec
发表日期2016-04-25
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We use a dynamic model of financing decisions to quantify agency conflicts across legal and institutional environments and decompose their effects into wealth transfers among stakeholders and value losses from policy distortions. Our estimates show that agency costs are large and vary widely across and within countries. Legal origin and provisions for investor protection affect agency costs, but they are more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally into wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions, the latter being larger where ownership is dispersed. Incentive misalignment captures 60% of country variation in leverage.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Capital structure Agency conflicts Corporate governance Structural estimation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11243
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540061
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Norman Schürhoff,Erwan Morellec. DP11243 Agency Conflicts Around the World. 2016.
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