| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11245 |
| DP11245 Family Networks and Distributive Politics | |
| Marcel Fafchamps; Julien Labonne | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-04-25 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We argue that incumbents share rents with central players to build and sustain coalitions. Using an unusually rich dataset, we show that households with high betweenness centrality – a measure of brokerage potential – receive more public services from their local government. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls for program eligibility, family ties with politicians, and other measures of centrality – which are not significant once betweenness is included. We provide further corroboration from indirect evidence from variation in size and electoral competition across municipalities. Finally, we show that in municipalities where politicians provide more goods and services to their relatives they target fewer goods to households with high betweenness centrality. The evidence supports the hypothesis that incumbent municipal politicians offer favorable access to public services to households most able to play a brokerage role in the formation of coalitions of families for electoral support. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11245 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540063 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcel Fafchamps,Julien Labonne. DP11245 Family Networks and Distributive Politics. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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