| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11256 |
| DP11256 Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants | |
| Alessandra Casella; Antonin Macé | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-02 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In polarized committees, majority voting disenfranchises the minority. Allowing voters to spend freely a fixed budget of votes over multiple issues restores some minority power. However, it also creates a complex strategic scenario: a hide-and-seek game between majority and minority voters that corresponds to a decentralized version of the Colonel Blotto game. We offer theoretical results and bring the game to the laboratory. The minority wins as frequently as theory predicts, despite subjects deviating from equilibrium strategies. Because subjects understand the logic of the game --- minority voters must concentrate votes unpredictably --- the exact choices are of secondary importance. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Storable votes Polarization Colonel blotto Tyranny of the majority Committees |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11256 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540074 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Antonin Macé. DP11256 Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
