| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11276 |
| DP11276 The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-14 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two parties can at some future date 2 negotiate about whether or not to collaborate in order to generate a surplus. Yet, the negotiation stage will be reached only if at date 1 both parties pay their respective transaction costs. We show that the expected total surplus may be larger when at date 1 the parties do not yet know the size of the surplus that can be generated at date 2. Moreover, joint ownership can be optimal under incomplete information even when it would be suboptimal under complete information. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Transaction costs Property rights Bargaining Incomplete information Joint ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11276 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540093 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP11276 The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information. 2016. |
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