| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11277 |
| DP11277 Politics in the Family Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms | |
| Marco Manacorda; Stefano Gagliarducci | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-15 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals’ labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of around 500,000 individuals ever holding political office, and we exploit information available in both datasets on a substring of each individual’s last name and municipality of birth in order to identify family ties. Using a diff-in-diff analysis that follows individuals as their family members enter and leave office, and correcting for the measurement error induced by our fuzzy matching method, we estimate that the monetary return to having a politician in the family is around 3.5 percent worth of private sector earnings and that each politician is able to extract rents for his family worth between one fourth and one full private sector job per year. The effect of nepotism is long lasting, extending well beyond the period in office. Consistent with the view that this is a technology of rent appropriation on the part of politicians, the effect increases with politicians’ clout and with the resources available in the administration where they serve. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Nepotism Family connections Politics Rent appropriation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11277 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540094 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Manacorda,Stefano Gagliarducci. DP11277 Politics in the Family Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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