G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11281
DP11281 Corruption and Bicameral Reforms
Giovanni Facchini; Cecilia Testa
发表日期2016-05-15
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to `hard time constraints', and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers' bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.
主题Public Economics
关键词Bicameralism Corruption Lobbying
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11281
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540098
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Giovanni Facchini,Cecilia Testa. DP11281 Corruption and Bicameral Reforms. 2016.
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