| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11281 |
| DP11281 Corruption and Bicameral Reforms | |
| Giovanni Facchini; Cecilia Testa | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-15 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to `hard time constraints', and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers' bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bicameralism Corruption Lobbying |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11281 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540098 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giovanni Facchini,Cecilia Testa. DP11281 Corruption and Bicameral Reforms. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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