| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11284 |
| DP11284 Excessive Competition for Headline Prices | |
| Roman Inderst; Obradovits Martin | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When firms can hide charges and consumers are prone to salient or relative thinking, this may have severe welfare consequences. The ensuring greater competition on headline prices, far from protecting consumers, may distort their choice and induce firms to offer inefficiently low product quality. As more intense competition leads to a larger pass-through of shrouded charges into lower headline prices, which aggravates these problems, competition policy alone cannot correct market outcomes. When competition is however complemented by effective consumer protection, high-quality firms have sufficient incentives to unshroud hidden charges, disciplining firms’ choice of quality and restoring efficiency. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Shrouded charges Hidden fees Price competition Shopping Attention Salience Unshrouding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11284-0 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540101 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roman Inderst,Obradovits Martin. DP11284 Excessive Competition for Headline Prices. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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