| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11285 |
| DP11285 Political Economy of Redistribution | |
| Konstantin Sonin; Georgy Egorov | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-18 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in the society makes property better protected from expropriation. We use a legislative bargaining-type model to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property rights protection. One is formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution that is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where players without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal veto power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. In a stable allocation, the society exhibits a "class" structure with class members having equal wealth, and strategically protecting each other from redistribution. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Political economy Legislative bargaining Property rights Institutions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11285 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540102 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konstantin Sonin,Georgy Egorov. DP11285 Political Economy of Redistribution. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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