| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11286 |
| DP11286 The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Decio Coviello; Andrea Guglielmo | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers' discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that the same firm wins repeatedly, and it does not deteriorate (and may improve) the procurement outcomes we observe. The effects of discretion persist when we repeat the analysis controlling for the geographical location, corruption, social capital and judicial efficiency in the region of the public buyers running the auctions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Procurement Restricted auctions Regression discontinuity Regulatory discretion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11286 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540103 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Decio Coviello,Andrea Guglielmo. DP11286 The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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