| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11291 |
| DP11291 Exclusive dealing with costly rent extraction | |
| Giacomo Calzolari; Vincenzo Denicolò; Piercarlo Zanchettin | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-22 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the impact of exclusive contracts on the intensity of competition among firms that supply substitute products. Exclusive contracts would be neutral if firms priced at marginal cost and extracted buyers' rent by means of non distortionary fixed fees. We focus instead on the case in which rent extraction is costly, and hence firms distort marginal prices upwards. We show that in this case exclusive contracts are anti-competitive when the dominant firm enjoys a large enough competitive advantage over its rivals, and are pro-competitive, or neutral, when the competitive advantage is small. These effects appear as soon as marginal prices are distorted upwards, irrespective of which specific factors impede perfect rent extraction. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Exclusive dealing Buyer's rent Rent extraction Antitrust Dominant firm |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11291 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540108 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Calzolari,Vincenzo Denicolò,Piercarlo Zanchettin. DP11291 Exclusive dealing with costly rent extraction. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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