| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11301 |
| DP11301 Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism | |
| Rui Albuquerque; Joerg Rocholl; Chendi Zhang | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-28 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The landmark decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission asserts for the first time that corporations benefit from First Amendment protection regarding freedom of speech in the form of independent political expenditures, thus creating a new avenue for political activism. This paper studies how corporations adjusted their political activism in response to this ruling. The paper presents evidence consistent with the hypothesis that institutional investors, in particular public pension funds, have a preference for not using the new avenue for political activism, a preference not shared by other investors. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11301 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540118 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Rui Albuquerque,Joerg Rocholl,Chendi Zhang. DP11301 Institutional Investors and Corporate Political Activism. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
