| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11304 |
| DP11304 Leveraging Dominance with Credible Bundling | |
| Doh-Shin Jeon | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-05-31 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We contribute to the leverage theory of tying by studying bundling of a dominant firm instead of a monopolist. We show that, when one firm has symmetric dominance across all markets, bundling has a positive demand size effect on the dominant firm but affects both firms similarly through the demand elasticity effect. The demand size affect is hump-shaped in dominance level whereas the demand elasticity affect is increasing and negative (positive) for low (high) dominance levels. This makes bundling credible for sufficiently strong dominance. In the case of asymmetric dominance levels, we identify three different circumstances in which a firm can credibly leverage its dominance in some (tying) markets to foreclose a dominant rival in other (tied) markets. Our findings provide a justification for the use of contractual bundling for foreclosure. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bundling Tying Leverage Dominance Entry barrier |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11304 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540120 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Doh-Shin Jeon. DP11304 Leveraging Dominance with Credible Bundling. 2016. |
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