| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11310 |
| DP11310 Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation | |
| Pieter A. Gautier; Xiaoming Cai; Ronald Wolthoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-03 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call “joint concavity.” Both outcomes can be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. Finally, we compare joint concavity to two other properties of meeting technologies, invariance and non rivalry, and explain the differences. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Search frictions Matching function Meeting technology Competing mechanisms |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11310 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540126 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pieter A. Gautier,Xiaoming Cai,Ronald Wolthoff. DP11310 Search Frictions, Competing Mechanisms and Optimal Market Segmentation. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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