| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11321 |
| DP11321 The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan | |
| Michael Callen; Saad Gulzar; Ali Hasanain; Muhammad Yasir Khan | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-10 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents evidence that one cause of absenteeism in the public sector is that government jobs are handed out as patronage. First, politicians routinely interfere when bureaucrats sanction absent doctors, and doctors are more absent in uncompetitive constituencies and when connected to politicians. Next, we find that the effects of two experimental interventions to address absence are attenuated in uncompetitive constituencies and for connected doctors. The first is a smartphone monitoring technology that nearly doubles inspection rates, and the second, representing the first experiment on the effects of providing data to policymakers, channels real time information on doctor absence. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Patronage Information communication technology Corruption Absence Political competition Political connections Data in policymaking |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11321 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540137 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Callen,Saad Gulzar,Ali Hasanain,et al. DP11321 The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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