| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11326 |
| DP11326 Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision | |
| Gyöngyi Lóránth; Giacomo Calzolari; Jean-Edouard Colliard | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-12 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the supervision of multinational banks (MNBs), allowing for either national or supranational supervision. National supervision leads to insufficient monitoring of MNBs due to a coordination problem between supervisors. Supranational supervision solves this problem and generates more monitoring. However, this increased monitoring can have unintended consequences, as it also affects the choice of foreign representation. Indeed, supranational supervision encourages MNBs to expand abroad using branches rather than subsidiaries, resulting in more pressure on their domestic deposit insurance fund. In some cases, it discourages foreign expansion altogether, so that financial integration paradoxically decreases. Our framework has implications on the design of supervisory arrangements for MNBs, the European Single Supervisory Mechanism being a prominent example. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Cross-border banks Multinational banks supervision Monitoring Regulation Banking union |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11326 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540142 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gyöngyi Lóránth,Giacomo Calzolari,Jean-Edouard Colliard. DP11326 Multinational Banks and Supranational Supervision. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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