| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11331 |
| DP11331 A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability | |
| Allan Drazen; Borağan Aruoba | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-15 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort, that is, a disciplining effect. We also find a positive but weaker selection effect. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4:2% compared to a one-term regime. JEL |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Discipline Selection Political agency Elections Structural estimation Maximum likelihood |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11331 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540147 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Allan Drazen,Borağan Aruoba. DP11331 A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability. 2016. |
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