| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11344 |
| DP11344 Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence | |
| Axel Dreher; Kai Gehring; Silvia Marchesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-22 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of governments in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. We analyze two alternative policy-decision schemes—‘decentralization’ and ‘centralization’— within a two-sided incomplete information principal-agent framework. The quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the government levels and on which government level controls the degree of decentralization. We show that the extent of misaligned interests and the relative importance of local and central government knowledge affect the optimal choice of policydecision schemes. Our empirical analysis confirms that countries’ choices depend on the relative importance of their private information. Importantly, results differ significantly between unitary and federal countries, in line with our theory. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Delegation Centralization Communication Fiscal decentralization State and local government |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11344 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540160 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Axel Dreher,Kai Gehring,Silvia Marchesi. DP11344 Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: Theory and evidence. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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