| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11345 |
| DP11345 The Adverse Effect of Information on Governance and Leverage | |
| Gyöngyi Lóránth; Alan Morrison; Christian Laux | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-22 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect that internal information systems have upon a firm’s leverage and corporate governance choices. Information systems lower governance costs by facilitating more targeted interventions. But they also generate asymmetric information between firms and their investors. As a result, firms may attempt to signal their superior quality by assuming more leverage. In some circumstances, this can reduce governance incentives and result in inferior outcomes. Investors anticipate this effect, and it renders information systems inefficient. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11345 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540161 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gyöngyi Lóránth,Alan Morrison,Christian Laux. DP11345 The Adverse Effect of Information on Governance and Leverage. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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