| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11350
|
| DP11350 When to Learn What in Bilateral Trade |
| Kfir Eliaz; Alexander Frug
|
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-24
|
| 出版年 | 2016
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We propose and analyze a model of bilateral trade in which private information about the quality of an asset can be acquired only gradually over time. An asset is characterized by a vector of binary i.i.d. attributes. The value of this asset to the seller and buyer is a weighted sum of the attributes, where the buyer's weights differ from the seller's. Initially, the seller is uninformed about the quality of the asset. In each period he decides whether to make a price offer (based on his current information) or to inspect the asset (postponing the sales offer). In the latter case, he chooses an attribute and (costlessly) learns its realization. The buyer does not observe the realized attributes before purchasing the good, however, he may or may not observe which inspections were performed by the seller (we consider both cases). We study the seller's strategic scheduling of inspections in this environment and its effect on the realized gains from trade in equilibrium. We identify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the players can realize some gains from trade, and all gains from trade. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Strategic scheduling
Gradual learning
Bilateral trade
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11350
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540166
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Kfir Eliaz,Alexander Frug. DP11350 When to Learn What in Bilateral Trade. 2016.
|
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