| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11362 |
| DP11362 Government as Borrower of First Resort | |
| Gilles Chemla; Christopher Hennessy | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine optimal provision of riskless government bonds under asymmetric information and safe asset scarcity. Paradoxically, corporations have incentives to issue junk debt precisely when intrinsic demand for safe debt is high since uninformed investors then migrate to risky overheated debt markets. Uninformed demand stimulates informed speculation which drives junk debt prices closer to fundamentals, encouraging pooling at high leverage. Acting as borrower of first resort, the government can issue safe bonds which siphon off uninformed demand for risky corporate debt and reduce socially wasteful informed speculation. Thus, government bonds either eliminate pooling at high leverage or improve risk sharing in such equilibria. The optimal quantity of government bonds is increasing in intrinsic demand for safe assets and non-monotonic in marginal Q. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate debt markets Governmet debt Issuers Asymmetric information Uninformed investors Speculators |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11362 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540176 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Chemla,Christopher Hennessy. DP11362 Government as Borrower of First Resort. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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