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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP11375 |
DP11375 The Effects of Higher Re-election Hurdles and Costs of Policy Change on Political Polarization | |
Hans Gersbach; Oriol Tejada; Philippe Muller | |
发表日期 | 2016-07-04 |
出版年 | 2016 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We develop and study a two-period model of political competition where (i) changes of policies impose costs on all individuals, and (ii) such costs increase linearly with the magnitude of the policy change. The contribution is two-fold. First, we show that intermediate marginal costs yield the lowest levels of policy polarization, welfare being a single-peaked function of the marginal cost. Second, we apply our model to the design of optimal re-election hurdles. We show that whatever the marginal cost of change, raising the vote-share needed for re-election above a half reduces policy polarization and increases welfare. We further prove the existence of a unique re-election hurdle that simultaneously maximizes welfare and minimizes policy polarization. The robustness of our results is studied for several extensions of the baseline model, notably for convex costs of change. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11375 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540189 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Oriol Tejada,Philippe Muller. DP11375 The Effects of Higher Re-election Hurdles and Costs of Policy Change on Political Polarization. 2016. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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