全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP11377 Electoral Accountability and the Natural Resource Curse: Theory and Evidence from India

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP11377
	DP11377 Electoral Accountability and the Natural Resource Curse: Theory and Evidence from India
	Pramila Krishnan; Amrita Dhillon; Manasa Patnam; Carlo Perroni
发表日期	2016-07-06
出版年	2016
语种	英语
摘要	Does secession yield economic dividends for natural resource rich regions? We exploit the formation of new Indian states in 2001 to uncover the effects of political secession on the comparative economic performance of natural resource rich and natural resource poor areas. We show that resource rich areas fare comparatively worse within the new states. Since the management and control of extraction rights in the Indian context resides with state-level institutions, we argue that these patterns reflect effects of political reorganisation on the quality of state governance in relation to natural resources. We describe a model of collusion between state politicians and local natural resource rent recipients that can account for the relationships we see in the data on how natural resource abundance shapes post-breakup local economic outcomes.
主题	Development Economics
关键词	Natural resources and economic performance Political secession Fiscal federalism
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp11377-0
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540191
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Pramila Krishnan,Amrita Dhillon,Manasa Patnam,et al. DP11377 Electoral Accountability and the Natural Resource Curse: Theory and Evidence from India. 2016.