G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11378
DP11378 Information Frictions and Market Power: A Laboratory Study
Xavier Vives; Anna Bayona; Jordi Brandts
发表日期2016-07-07
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要In a laboratory experiment with supply function competition and private information about correlated costs we study whether cost interdependence leads to greater market power in relation to when costs are uncorrelated in the ways predicted by Bayesian supply function equilibrium. We find that with uncorrelated costs observed behavior is close to the theoretical benchmark. However, with interdependent costs and precise private signals, market power does not raise above the case of uncorrelated costs contrary to the theoretical prediction. This is consistent with subjects not being able to make inferences from the market price when costs are interdependent. We find that this effect is less severe when private signals are noisier.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Supply function competition Private information Wholesale electricity market
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11378-0
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540192
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Xavier Vives,Anna Bayona,Jordi Brandts. DP11378 Information Frictions and Market Power: A Laboratory Study. 2016.
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