| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11379
|
| DP11379 Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled? |
| Ran Spiegler
|
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-08
|
| 出版年 | 2016
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The conventional rational-expectations postulate rules out the possibility that agents will form systematically biased forecasts of economic variables. I revisit this question under the assumption that agents' expectations are based on a misperceived causal model. Specifically, I analyze a model in which an agent forms forecasts of economic variables after observing a signal. His forecasts are based on fitting a subjective causal model - formalized as a direct acyclic graph, following the "Bayesian networks" literature - to objective long-run data. I show that the agent's forecasts are never systematically biased if and only if his graph is perfect - equivalently, if the direction of the causal links he postulates has no empirical content. I demonstrate the relevance of this result for economic applications - mainly a stylized "monetary policy" example in which the inflation-output relation obeys an expectations-augmented Phillips curve. |
| 主题 | Monetary Economics and Fluctuations
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11379
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540193
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ran Spiegler. DP11379 Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?. 2016.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
