G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11380
DP11380 Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards
Gyöngyi Lóránth; Christian Laux; Julian Kolm
发表日期2016-07-08
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders' incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Bank regulation Executive compensation Corporate governance
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11380
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540194
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gyöngyi Lóránth,Christian Laux,Julian Kolm. DP11380 Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards. 2016.
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