| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11380 |
| DP11380 Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards | |
| Gyöngyi Lóránth; Christian Laux; Julian Kolm | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-08 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the limits of regulating bank CEO compensation to reduce risk shifting in the presence of an active board that retains the right to approve new investment strategies. Compensation regulation prevents overinvestment in strategies that increase risk, but it is ineffective in preventing underinvestment in strategies that reduce risk. The regulator optimally combines compensation and capital regulations. In contrast, if the board delegates the choice of strategy to the CEO, compensation regulation is sufficient to prevent both types of risk shifting. Compensation regulation increases shareholders' incentives to implement an active board, which reduces the effectiveness of compensation regulation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank regulation Executive compensation Corporate governance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11380 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540194 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gyöngyi Lóránth,Christian Laux,Julian Kolm. DP11380 Bank Regulation, CEO Compensation, and Boards. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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