G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11397
DP11397 Competitive Effects of Partial Control in an Input Supplier
Luis Cabral; Helder Vasconcelos; Duarte Brito
发表日期2016-07-19
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Motivated by recent competition policy cases, we study an industry where downstream firms partially own a supplier. If ownership corresponds to control, then consumer surplus is higher and possibly non-monotonic with respect to the ownership share. We provide conditions such that consumers are better off when ownership of the upstream firm is shared by the downstream firms; and when ownership is partial (i.e., less than 100%). These results are based on two effects of partial ownership: first, a vertical-control effect, which effectively reduces the extent of double marginalization; and second, a tunneling effect, whereby the downstream firms use the wholesale price as a means to transfer value from independent upstream shareholders.
主题Industrial Organization
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11397
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540211
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Luis Cabral,Helder Vasconcelos,Duarte Brito. DP11397 Competitive Effects of Partial Control in an Input Supplier. 2016.
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