| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11397 |
| DP11397 Competitive Effects of Partial Control in an Input Supplier | |
| Luis Cabral; Helder Vasconcelos; Duarte Brito | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-19 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Motivated by recent competition policy cases, we study an industry where downstream firms partially own a supplier. If ownership corresponds to control, then consumer surplus is higher and possibly non-monotonic with respect to the ownership share. We provide conditions such that consumers are better off when ownership of the upstream firm is shared by the downstream firms; and when ownership is partial (i.e., less than 100%). These results are based on two effects of partial ownership: first, a vertical-control effect, which effectively reduces the extent of double marginalization; and second, a tunneling effect, whereby the downstream firms use the wholesale price as a means to transfer value from independent upstream shareholders. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11397 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540211 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luis Cabral,Helder Vasconcelos,Duarte Brito. DP11397 Competitive Effects of Partial Control in an Input Supplier. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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