| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP11398
|
| DP11398 Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks |
| Yves Zenou; Thierry Verdier
|
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-19
|
| 出版年 | 2016
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Consider a network of firms where a firm T is given the opportunity to innovate a product (first-generation innovation). If successful, this firm can temporarily sell this innovation to her direct neighbors because this will give her access to a larger market. However, if her direct neighbors innovate themselves on top of firm T's innovation (second-generation innovations), then firm T loses the right to sell her initial innovation to the remaining firms in the market. We analyze this game where each firm (T and her direct neighbors) has to decide at which price they want to sell their innovation. We show that the optimal price policy of each firm depends on the level of property rights protection, the position of firm T in the network, her degree and the size of the market. We then analyze the welfare implications of our model where the planner that maximizes total welfare has to decide which firm to target. We show that it depends on the level of property rights protection and on the network structure in a non-trivial way. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Networks
Diffusion centrality
Targets
Innovation
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11398
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540212
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Yves Zenou,Thierry Verdier. DP11398 Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks. 2016.
|
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
