G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11398
DP11398 Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks
Yves Zenou; Thierry Verdier
发表日期2016-07-19
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要Consider a network of firms where a firm T is given the opportunity to innovate a product (first-generation innovation). If successful, this firm can temporarily sell this innovation to her direct neighbors because this will give her access to a larger market. However, if her direct neighbors innovate themselves on top of firm T's innovation (second-generation innovations), then firm T loses the right to sell her initial innovation to the remaining firms in the market. We analyze this game where each firm (T and her direct neighbors) has to decide at which price they want to sell their innovation. We show that the optimal price policy of each firm depends on the level of property rights protection, the position of firm T in the network, her degree and the size of the market. We then analyze the welfare implications of our model where the planner that maximizes total welfare has to decide which firm to target. We show that it depends on the level of property rights protection and on the network structure in a non-trivial way.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Networks Diffusion centrality Targets Innovation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11398
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540212
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Yves Zenou,Thierry Verdier. DP11398 Innovation, Pricing and Targeting in Networks. 2016.
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