G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP11408
DP11408 Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity
Thomas Philippon; Miguel Faria e castro; Joseba Martinez
发表日期2016-07-22
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the risk of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained.
主题Financial Economics
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp11408
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540222
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Thomas Philippon,Miguel Faria e castro,Joseba Martinez. DP11408 Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity. 2016.
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