| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP11408 |
| DP11408 Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity | |
| Thomas Philippon; Miguel Faria e castro; Joseba Martinez | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-07-22 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the risk of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp11408 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/540222 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Philippon,Miguel Faria e castro,Joseba Martinez. DP11408 Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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